History: Jürgen Hubbert — the man walked with W140

Jürgen Hubbert may have been one of the very few Mercedes-Benz executives widely known in the pre-internet era. As “Mr. Mercedes,” his public stature was arguably no less prominent than that of Jürgen Schrempp. Yet, for such a significant figure, the W140 nearly caused him to stumble at the final step of his professional career.

On December 4, 2020, I spoke with Mr. Hubbert’s former assistant about the possibility of consulting him on certain matters from the past. The response I received was unequivocal:

“Definitely not. He is now waving goodbye to anyone in public life, as he will retire fully and also give up his office. He has some medical problems to overcome and will no longer appear in public—neither for his former company nor for any other purpose. He is looking forward solely to family life, and I think we should take that seriously.”

I should have known that I had started too late. Just over a month later, on January 12, 2021, Mr. Hubbert passed away, aged 81.

With regard to the W140—the subject on which our school has chosen to focus—Hubbert was not, in a strict sense, a truly pivotal figure. Yet on the visible portion of the iceberg above the waterline, on the obvious and public timeline, there is a striking overlap between the W140 and Hubbert’s career. I would suggest that the W140 may have had a far greater impact on Hubbert than Hubbert ever had on the W140. We will see this unfold later, and in doing so, come to a clearer understanding of the relationship between Hubbert and the W140. Fortunately, thanks to Hubbert’s wide circle of connections, we are still able to hear his stories through the people who worked alongside him.

Another man from within

Jürgen Hubbert was born in Stuttgart in 1939. His father was a mechanical engineer employed by a local industrial firm. Growing up in a household that placed great value on technical precision and craftsmanship, Hubbert was exposed to engineering principles from an early age. His childhood unfolded at the intersection of traditional German workmanship and the rapid technological advances of the postwar era. From a young age, Hubbert showed a strong fascination with mechanics, vehicles, and the logic of engineering. He was particularly captivated by the German automotive industry as it flourished in the 1950s. His early experiences included visits to local manufacturing plants, as well as participation in technical clubs and youth engineering programs. His formal education began at the Stuttgart Institute of Technology, where he enrolled in mechanical engineering in 1959. During his university years, Hubbert studied under several influential figures in the engineering world, including professors who placed strong emphasis on practical application and close cooperation with industry.

His professional career began in the 1965, shortly after completing his graduate studies. He joined Mercedes-Benz as his first employer, where he worked on experimental engineering projects aimed at improving vehicle performance and safety. His early responsibilities centered on the development of lightweight materials and on enhancing engine reliability—both critical priorities in the highly competitive automotive market of the 1960s. One of his early breakthroughs was his contribution to the development of more efficient fuel-injection systems, which improved engine performance while reducing emissions. This achievement marked a turning point in his career, establishing him as an engineer capable of bridging the gap between theoretical research and practical application. His work attracted the attention of senior management, and within a few years he was promoted to project leadership roles.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Hubbert took on increasingly complex projects, including the design of safety systems and innovations in vehicle chassis structures. He adopted a strongly collaborative approach, working closely with multidisciplinary teams ranging from mechanical engineers to materials scientists, and fostered a culture of innovation within his groups. During this formative period, Hubbert also actively built networks with industry peers and academic researchers. He frequently attended international conferences and published papers on advances in automotive engineering. His reputation as an innovative engineer committed to the development of sustainable, high-efficiency automobiles grew steadily, establishing him as a rising figure in the German automotive industry.

In 1973, Hubbert assumed the role of Head of Construction Preparation at the Sindelfingen plant, a position he held for twelve years. During this time, he was also responsible for the planning of the Bremen plant, which began producing passenger cars in 1978. In 1985, he took on the coordination of Group strategy and medium-term planning, as well as the management of commissioned projects for both passenger and commercial vehicles. By 1987, as Daimler’s new leadership team was still undecided, Alfred Herrhausen—the Chairman of Daimler AG’s Supervisory Board and a representative of Daimler’s largest shareholder, Deutsche Bank—considered Hubbert to be the most capable candidate below the board level and nominated him for the role of Board Member responsible for Materials Management. Ultimately, however, the complex political decision favored Helmut Werner from Continental, an outsider who temporarily occupied the position Hubbert had been poised to take.

A few months later, in July 1987, Helmut Werner was transferred to the Commercial Vehicles division to prove his capabilities. Hubbert, in turn, advanced alongside his predecessor and “insider,” Werner Niefer, becoming his deputy and Vice President of the Passenger Cars division. Hubbert and Werner were both career-long Daimler loyalists, deeply rooted in the company and highly respected within its ranks. However, leadership at Daimler was not determined by popular vote, but by the Supervisory Board. In any case, the 47-year-old Hubbert, together with Helmut Werner and Jürgen Schrempp, had already emerged as one of the three leading candidates poised to take the helm of Daimler in the future.

Getting involved the W140

Hubbert became the second-in-command of the Passenger Cars division, while the ultimate authority remained with Niefer. After becoming Vice President of Daimler in September 1987, Niefer, with his preference for the S-Class, was able to allocate resources more freely and operate with greater ease. It was well known how steadfast Niefer was once he took charge of the W140, while Hubbert excelled at organizing and managing the associated tasks. By this stage, the W140 had already reached structural freeze. Three engine variants were advancing through development in an orderly fashion, the Vor-prototype had already undergone crash testing, and the first round of summer testing had been completed. However, it soon became apparent that this eloquent manager—capable of delivering polished speeches without preparation—found it difficult to assert himself in boardroom debates. This was especially true when facing the forceful Entwicklungschef Wolfgang Peter, who, to many within Mercedes-Benz, came across as something of a loose cannon.

Unlike the often outspoken and sometimes blunt Niefer, Hubbert was equally sincere but preferred to motivate himself and his team with a quiet, modest approach. When he joined the Passenger Cars division, BMW had just launched the V12 7er, an event that stirred a mix of fear, anger, and contempt within Mercedes. When Niefer showed little enthusiasm for the 300-PS V12, Hubbert was bold enough to tell journalists at the Paris Motor Show, “That really hit us in the face.” He was certainly independent-minded. At board meetings, he once complained that part of Bruno Sacco’s team was designing household appliances for Daimler’s newly acquired AEG, a remark that annoyed Daimler’s chief strategist, Edzard Reuter. At the time, AEG was being granted Mercedes-Benz production-facility business as part of Daimler’s attempt to create an internal economic loop, and conscientious Mercedes employees were uncomfortable with this kind of “left hand doing business with the right” arrangement.

Another of Hubbert’s far-reaching ideas was to bring Mercedes back to top-level motorsport after an absence dating back to 1955. Beginning in 1987, he discussed with Niefer the possibility of funding the Sauber team in Group C racing, and in 1988 he ultimately convinced Niefer to establish a dedicated motorsport department—fielding the 190 E in Group A competition and providing full factory backing to Sauber. Hubbert himself was not a racing enthusiast, but he clearly understood the positive impact a return to motorsport would have on the company’s upcoming products, particularly the new SL R129. In June 1989, following a reorganization of Daimler-Benz AG, Mercedes-Benz AG was formally established. With Werner Niefer promoted to the Management Board, Hubbert joined the Board as the member responsible for the Passenger Cars division.

In June 1990, MBAG management conducted the final acceptance of the W140 in Almería, southern Spain. BMW’s counterpart remained one of Hubbert’s foremost concerns. As a result, his very first test drive was carried out together with Versuchsdirektor Hermann Gaus in a BMW 750. “That’s that, then—now it’s our turn again,” he remarked. Although the launch of the new S-Class had been delayed from the media’s point of view, Hubbert believed the timing was exactly right and that the program was fully on schedule. “Our W140 is an outstanding example of this. Certain details can certainly be found in other cars in the upper class, but in no current offering does one find the optimal balance of all capabilities taken together. The difference, therefore, is not large—but it is refined. More fundamentally, it is conceptual. And that is what ultimately makes such a refined result possible.”

“Since we readjusted the vehicle’s instantaneous center of gravity, the car really feels like it’s on a track.” The decision to adjust the instantaneous center of gravity was made after a test drive in late 1988, requiring a great deal of expertise and ingenuity from the engineers, and could only be accomplished through overtime and weekend work. This is because changing the instantaneous center of gravity alters the so-called kinematics of the axle design, thereby shortening the distance between this hypothetical center of gravity and the vehicle’s center of gravity (located 200 millimeters above the axle center point). Expected effect: Reduced roll tendency, making the vehicle more stable and safer on the road. To find this new center of gravity, the engineers had to optimize the corresponding CAD/CAM programs until they found the appropriate pivot point on the multi-link rear axle required to connect the axles and wheels. “A few millimeters is enough,” as Hubbert said, “but those few millimeters are crucial.”

With both Niefer and Peter—two intensely driven technocrats, Hubbert may well have perceived certain “issues” of the W140 from his role. Yet beyond refining a road that had already been laid, there was little he could realistically change. Where Hubbert’s team proved most helpful to the W140 was in marketing, devising a series of imaginative and unconventional strategies. To prepare the press, the first “key moment” in September 1990 focused on the gradual phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons. In November, the theme shifted to safety and crash behavior, accompanied by the release of the first official photograph. In December, 400 journalists gathered in Sindelfingen for the Mercedes-Benz Innovation Forum. For the general public, five million Deutsche Marks were invested in print and television advertising starting in January 1991. Finally, at the Geneva premiere in March 1991, Hubbert, Niefer, and Peter jointly unveiled the new S-Class.

Almost tripped

The early, sharp criticism directed at the W140 focused primarily on its weight and price, and at first it caused little concern within MBAG’s leadership. The closer the debate was to its place of origin, the more heated it became; the closer it was to its markets, the milder it sounded. German automotive journalists, some of whom even framed their criticism in terms of “industrial arrogance” out of sympathy for the sentiments of former East German citizens, appeared strikingly divided. In the S-Class’s most important market—the United States—virtually none of these accusations attracted any real attention. That said, market performance did begin to suffer as the global recession set in during 1991. In the first months after launch, the W140 largely carried forward the strong sales expectations established by the W126. However, as markets contracted, competitors multiplied, and quality complaints began to surface, deliveries increasingly encountered difficulties.

The new SEC can be regarded as another Waterloo for Mercedes-Benz at the dawn of a new decade. In January 1992, the C140 was hastily unveiled in Detroit, at a time when only a handful of prototype cars had been built—there had not even been time to produce proper press photographs. After Hubbert, as usual, delivered a glowing tribute to the automobile before the assembled guests, the response was met with only sparse applause. For many attendees, this most expensive Mercedes ever built appeared stylistically peculiar. Were it not for its overwhelming technical superiority, it might have been subjected to far harsher—and potentially brutal—criticism from the American press. Two months later, the SEC was presented once again by Hubbert, this time at Geneva, in an attempt to relaunch it to the public.

The successful cooperation with AMG in motorsport eventually led Mercedes to form an alliance with AMG in the passenger-car sector as well. The agreement was reached in 1990 and came into effect in January 1991. Under the plan, AMG was to produce AMG versions of the existing SL and the new S-Class, with sales handled through Mercedes-Benz’s own dealer network. In September 1991, the first AMG S-Class was completed. Unfortunately, by the 1992 the situation surrounding both the W140 and the company as a whole had deteriorated sharply, and the car failed to generate the level of response that had been anticipated. As a result, the AMG S-Class cooperation was ultimately abandoned. Under mounting pressure, Edzard Reuter instructed Niefer and Hubbert to shut down a number of ill-timed investments, including the Group C and Formula 1. Reuter claimed that he would rather go horseback riding or practice archery.

Hubbert was a calm and rational manager. Much like the moment when he quietly acknowledged BMW’s brief advantage, he carried out the responsibilities entrusted to him with discipline, while remaining willing to admit—when confronted with facts—that not every decision had been made in the right direction. Despite exhausting every possible means to support the marketing of the W140, he ultimately had to bow to the reality of the sales figures and began to regard the project with a sense of frustration. Before long, he openly conceded that “the former goal was to build the best car in the world” —this is no longer the case. He did not believe that competitors’ mockery of the W140 stemmed from any technical superiority on their part, but rather from a market that had shifted toward more economical and pragmatic products. He was forced to accept that the W140’s design appeared bloated, and he ordered the design department to undertake an early facelift—transforming the W140 from something that looked like Niefer into something that looked like Hubbert.

In the traditional Mercedes-Benz model, long development cycles meant that a single vehicle would often pass through two or even three generations of leadership. Unlike their American counterparts—who at times could not even maintain continuity in a model’s name—the Swabians remained loyal to tradition. Each successive leadership generation would take over what the previous one had left unfinished and carry it through according to the original plan. Before the 1990s, this approach had never failed them. Hubbert followed this tradition precisely. He took over the baton during the final third of the W140’s nearly ten-year development and witnessed the completion of the project. Yet blame descended upon him unnecessarily. Some argued that he and Niefer had together dragged the company into the abyss through the W140 and the motorsport program, culminating in Mercedes’s historic losses in 1992.

While many sought to distance themselves from both the W140 and its consequences for the sake of their careers, Niefer proved resilient. Until his retirement, he worked tirelessly to stabilize the company—and never once spoke ill of the W140. Hubbert did the same, and the project’s failure did not drive a wedge between him and Niefer. Tragedy soon followed. In September 1993, shortly after stepping down from the Management Board but while still actively serving the company, Niefer died from surgical complications. With his passing, the remaining responsibility for the W140 fell squarely on Hubbert’s shoulders. Helmut Werner—an outsider who was neither a Mercedes man nor even an automotive insider—returned from the commercial vehicles division to replace Niefer as Chairman of MBAG’s Board. It was a position that, by all accounts, should have gone to Hubbert.

Hubbert had indeed been tripped up. “The next generation of the S-Class may not even have a V12,” he remarked—clearly angered that a great car had gone unrecognized. Yet if producing more economical and practical vehicles was what the public demanded, he was prepared to devote himself fully to that goal as well. Following a series of cost-reduction measures, he worked in close cooperation with the new head of development, Dieter Zetsche. By the end of 1993 the production costs of many W140 components had been reduced by 30%. Without altering the retail price, the savings were redirected toward areas more visible to customers. These improvements, combined with a program of visual slimming, were unveiled at the Geneva Motor Show in March 1994 and achieved a measure of success in the marketplace. Most notably, in the crucial North American market, W140 sales rebounded significantly.

Falling in Love Again

The recession of the early 90s dealt a heavy blow to luxury manufacturers such as Rolls-Royce and Ferrari. The parent company of Rolls-Royce, Vickers, decided that Rolls-Royce would have to find its own way forward. At one point, the W140 had been regarded as a product approaching Rolls-Royce territory, and Hubbert viewed this wounded segment with lingering unease—an unease that would shape the course of his career. On the one hand, he repeatedly cited Rolls-Royce’s business model in meetings as a negative example, arguing that products should no longer pursue ever-narrower extremes. On the other hand, he was deeply concerned about the possibility of Rolls-Royce falling into BMW’s hands. As a result, Mercedes-Benz initiated a series of contacts with Rolls-Royce to explore the potential of supplying technology. Hubbert, however, had no intention of “marrying” it.

Rolls-Royce understood that merely acquiring advanced German technology would not be enough to redeem itself, and so it was forced to spread its legs. Hubbert had no desire to further reduce the “safety distance” between Mercedes-Benz and this British grande dame, and the discussions were brought to an early close. Reports soon emerged that Rolls-Royce had turned to BMW—a development that deeply frustrated Hubbert. He had once stated that the next generation of the S-Class would not feature a V12, yet in the foreseeable future the market would see even more BMW V12s, and even Volkswagen ones. Still, within Mercedes-Benz there was no real sense of regret. If they were capable of building cars superior to Rolls-Royce, there was no need to pay the British to elevate their own stature. In 1998, BMW sent out its wedding invitations to the press: Rolls-Royce would not only adopt the V12 from the 7 Series, but would ultimately become a Bavarian badge. As for its sister brand Bentley, it was taken by Ferdinand Piëch—the very man who had once mocked the W140.

Jürgen Schrempp, an industrialist who had built his early career in South Africa’s automotive sector, joined Daimler’s aerospace arm, DASA, in 1989 and went on to oversee the acquisition of Fokker. Riding a wave of momentum and operating at a distance from Stuttgart, he demonstrated considerable political skill. In 1995, he unexpectedly emerged victorious among the three successors identified back in 1987 and championed the union of Daimler and Chrysler—a ticking time bomb—wagering that it would not detonate before his retirement. Helmut Werner, whether out of concern for the company or dissatisfaction with his own prospects, opposed the deal. As a result, he was unceremoniously dismissed by Schrempp—an unusually stark episode that laid bare internal conflict at Mercedes to an unprecedented degree. As a result, Hubbert stepped into Werner’s position—arriving four years later than expected, but finally reaching it nonetheless. As for striking back at BMW and Rolls-Royce, Hubbert believed the time had finally come.

Hubbert decided to devote one year to creating a concept car capable of challenging Rolls-Royce, using the then-expensive W140 as its foundation. Although it was no longer as advanced as the new S-Class under development, it was more than sufficient to take on Rolls-Royce. The project, codenamed Diamond, set advanced design teams in Tokyo and California against each other. Ultimately, the Tokyo team’s proposal prevailed, and construction began on the W140-based concept. The winning 1:5 model was swiftly presented to Schrempp, who—eager to expand his new empire on an unprecedented scale was strongly supportive of a showcase capable of enhancing the company’s image. At the Tokyo Motor Show in November 1997, Hubbert stood arm in arm with Mrs. Schmidt Maybach, granddaughter of Wilhelm Maybach, to announce Mercedes-Benz’s response to the world: the pinnacle of the automobile had returned to the age of excess.

Although Hubbert—scarred by the experience of the W140—remained cautious, he nevertheless declared in 1998 that Maybach would become a reality: “I cannot imagine that we would not build the Maybach, given the enthusiasm both among the public and within our own company. This vehicle is not about production volumes, but about the prestige of being present at the very top of the automotive hierarchy.” Development of the W240 began in 1999, and within a remarkably short period it entered production in 2002. It became the highest-tier Mercedes-Benz automobile since the discontinuation of the W100 in 1981.

History seemed to repeat itself. When the first W240 arrived in New York aboard the Queen Elizabeth 2 in June 2002 and was unveiled in a lavish ballroom, Hubbert once again received only sparse applause after delivering his speech. During this same period, Rolls-Royce—stimulated by the Maybach concept car—produced an even more imposing Phantom VI within a remarkably short time, overtaking the Maybach in sheer scale through a classic case of latecomer advantage. Before Hubbert’s retirement in 2004, the W240 initially achieved respectable sales, but demand soon declined sharply, particularly under the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. Where the W140 had been criticized for being too large, the W240 was faulted for lacking the commanding presence associated with Rolls-Royce. The project was ultimately brought to an end in 2013 by Hubbert’s former colleague, Dieter Zetsche.

The End

Much has already been written here about Jürgen Hubbert, yet it remains only a small fragment when set against the breadth of his remarkable life. It should be remembered that Hubbert was the man who transformed Mercedes-Benz—then offering only a handful of passenger-car models in 1993—into a vast automotive family, and who was also a principal driving force behind Mercedes’ return to motorsport after 1955, leading to a series of great achievements. The W140 was not the central focus of Hubbert’s life, nor was Hubbert a decisive figure in the development of the W140. Yet in this particular chapter of history, their destinies seem repeatedly intertwined, intersecting and echoing one another.

Ola Källenius, Chairman of the Board of Management of Daimler AG and Mercedes-Benz AG, offered the following assessment of Jürgen Hubbert: “Jürgen Hubbert was Mister Mercedes. With integrity, innovative spirit and great success, he shaped Mercedes-Benz forever. Under his responsibility, a historic product offensive was launched with groundbreaking vehicles such as the A- and M-Class. As a leader, he was able to integrate and motivate his teams with a passion for technology and the highest standards for himself. He is forever assured of the appreciation of the entire Mercedes family. In gratitude for his many years of good work, we will honor his memory. On behalf of the entire Board of Management of Daimler AG, I send our condolences to his family and relatives. We mourn a great personality and a great person.”

May his legacy endure.